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  1 
COMPELLED DIPLOMACY IN 
ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY 
Ryan M. Scoville* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The basics of Zivotofsky v. Kerry are by now familiar. Congress 
enacted Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 
2003 to require that the Secretary of State record “Israel” as the 
country of birth on the passport of any Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen 
who so requests,1 but two successive presidential administrations 
have refused to implement the statute. To the parties and lower 
courts, this has primarily been a dispute about the nature of the 
President’s power to recognize foreign borders. But what if the law 
also raises another, entirely separate issue under Article II?  
Consider the possibility that § 214(d) is unconstitutional not be-
cause it recognizes a border or materially interferes with the im-
plementation of U.S. recognition policy, but simply because it pur-
ports to compel diplomatic speech that the President opposes. From 
this angle, Zivotofsky presents a question about who controls official 
diplomatic communications, and recognition is beside the point.  
                                                            
 
 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. 
1 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 
214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
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I.  The Statute is Not an Act of Recognition 
 
Zivotofsky has a number of conceivable resolutions even if the 
recognition power belongs exclusively to the President. One is to 
hold that § 214(d) is unconstitutional because it infringes on the 
President’s power by requiring or effecting a formal change in U.S. 
recognition policy. But this approach would be problematic. The 
Supreme Court is “obligated to construe . . . statute[s] to avoid con-
stitutional problems if it is ‘fairly possible’ to do so”2 and assumes 
that Congress operates with respect for background principles of 
law.3 In the recent case of Bond v. United States, the Court demon-
strated a willingness to apply these canons aggressively in cases 
presenting constitutional challenges to enactments that implicate 
foreign relations.4 The central question on appeal was whether fed-
eralism constrains Congress’s power to implement treaties, but 
Bond sidestepped the issue by simply interpreting the challenged 
statute not to apply.5 According to the majority, “a fair reading of 
statutory text” requires “recognizing that ‘Congress legislates 
against the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed presumptions,”6 and a 
court should not interpret a statute as departing from those pre-
sumptions absent a “clear indication” of legislative intent.7 Some 
commentators thought the provision in question to be plainly appli-
cable, but a majority of the Justices found the text ambiguous and 
thus insufficient to overcome a presumption that Congress legis-
lates in ways that honor the traditional spheres of federal and state 
power.8 Particularly after Bond, the Court appears unwilling to con-
                                                            
 
 
 
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008). 
3 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-93 (2014). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 2087-93. 
6 Id. at 2088 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
7 Id. at 2090. 
8 Id. at 2033. 
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3 
strue foreign relations statutes in ways that generate constitutional 
concerns unless absolutely necessary.  
Thinking in a loosely Bond-like way means that the initial task 
in Zivotofsky is to identify whether there might be any “unexpressed 
presumptions” relevant to the interpretation of § 214(d). A reasona-
ble answer is yes. In the past, the president has recognized states by 
negotiating treaties with them, making declarations, dispatching 
diplomatic agents, and issuing exequaturs.9 Not only is that practice 
consistent with the historical international law on recognition,10 
there appear to be at most two occasions on which Congress has 
purported to recognize a foreign sovereign since 1787, and neither 
of those involved passports.11 An earlier edition of the Restatement 
went so far as to explain that the “issuance of passports that permit 
travel in [an] area controlled by [an] unrecognized regime” does not 
amount to implied recognition.12 Modern Supreme Court precedent 
has consistently described recognition as an executive power.13 And 
without causing any apparent disturbance to U.S. policy against the 
recognition of Taiwanese independence, a law similar to § 214(d) 
                                                            
 
 
 
9 JOHN G. HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 
(1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 104 cmt. a (1965). 
10 See TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 189-223 (L. C. 
Green ed., 1951) (discussing modes of recognition); H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 369-403 (1947) (same). 
11 Robert Reinstein finds that Congress has recognized foreign sovereigns on four 
occasions: (1) an 1800 statute declaring the island of Hispaniola to be a dependency 
of France, (2) an 1806 statute prohibiting trade with an independent Haiti, (3) an 1861 
statute authorizing the appointment of diplomatic representatives to Haiti and Libe-
ria, and (4) an 1898 joint resolution declaring Cuba’s independence from Spain. See 
Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 1 
(2013). I question, however, whether two of these are true examples of recognition. 
See Ryan Scoville, De Jure and de Facto Recognition as a Framework for Zivotofsky, 
OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 30, 2014, 2:14 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/30/guest-
post-de-jure-de-facto-recognition-framework-zivotofsky/. 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 104 cmt. c (1965). 
13 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Nat’l 
City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955).  
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grants some U.S. citizens the option to list “Taiwan” as the place of 
birth on their passports.14 In short, the idea that a passport statute 
can independently accomplish a change in recognition policy is so 
odd that it is fair to start with the presumption that Congress never 
considered it.15 To overcome that presumption there should be clear 
evidence of legislative intent to effectuate a bold new policy 
through unprecedented means.  
I think § 214(d) falls short of that mark. First, the text suggests a 
modest aim. “Israel” will appear on the passport of an American 
born in Jerusalem only when the individual bearer has requested as 
much,16 and only for limited purposes such as “registration of 
birth.”17 These constraints create a realistic possibility that the stat-
ute is simply about personal identification; going forward, some 
will exercise the statutory right as a matter of individual preference, 
while others will not. Notably, the law does not expressly claim a 
recognition effect.18 
                                                            
 
 
 
14 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 
103-236, § 132, 108 Stat. 382, 395 (“For purposes of the registration of birth or certifi-
cation of nationality of a United States citizen born in Taiwan, the Secretary of State 
shall permit the place of birth to be recorded as Taiwan.”). 
15 This argument implies an answer to the core question of who holds the recogni-
tion power, but one could make an analogous critique of the Court’s analysis in 
Bond—i.e., using a federalism presumption to resolve the meaning of ambiguous 
treaty-implementing legislation implies that federalism is a relevant principle for 
that type of enactment, which in turn suggests that Missouri v. Holland was wrong in 
holding that federalism does not limit Congress’s power to implement treaties. See 
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088-93. 
16 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 
214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
17 Id. 
18 A report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations described 214(d) and 
its companion provisions as “related to the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capi-
tal,” but that seems insufficient. S. Rep. No. 107-60, at 12 (2001). Aside from the fact 
that the report is legislative history, the statute could be “related” to recognition in a 
number of ways other than as a device by which to accomplish recognition, includ-
ing as a signal of congressional displeasure with the national policy. Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 § 214(d).  
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Second, § 214(d) does not trigger any of recognition’s tradition-
al consequences. It is well known that recognition entitles the recip-
ient to send diplomatic agents, sue and invoke certain sovereign 
defenses in U.S. courts, and otherwise exercise the prerogatives of 
statehood in relations with the United States.19 Yet no one thinks 
these rights hinge on a passport statute. Not even the Administra-
tion contends, for example, that § 214(d) extends the act of state 
doctrine to the operations of the Israeli government in Jerusalem.20 
Neither do the House and Senate.21 It seems untenable, therefore, to 
interpret § 214(d) as formally changing U.S. policy on the status of 
Jerusalem.  
 
II.  The Statute Probably Does Not Interfere with Recognition 
Policy 
 
Another possible resolution is to hold that the statute is uncon-
stitutional because it infringes on the President’s recognition power 
not by formally canceling a U.S. policy of neutrality, but rather by 
forcing the President to issue official diplomatic communications 
that interfere with the policy’s implementation. This is the Admin-
istration’s central argument,22 and it relies on the premise that Arti-
cle II confers authority not only to recognize, but also to give effect 
to determinations on recognition. The argument avoids the textual 
and precedential difficulties that arise from reading the statute as an 
act of recognition, while still drawing strength from the predomi-
                                                            
 
 
 
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 205 cmt. a (1987) (right to sue in U.S. courts); Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of 
China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955) (right to assert sovereign immunity); Oetjen v. Cent. 
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918) (right to assert the act of state doctrine). 
20 See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 11-23, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 
13-628 (U.S. argued Nov. 3, 2014). 
21 Brief for Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici Curi-
ae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 20, at 22; Brief for the United States Senate as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 20, at 20-21.. 
22 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 25. 
 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty  [Vol. 9.1:1 
 
 
6 
nant sense that the statute implicates an exclusively executive do-
main.  
It is not obvious, however, that the Administration should pre-
vail with this approach. Even assuming that the recognition power 
contains a related power to render an executive determination effec-
tive, it is unclear what that rule would permit of the courts and 
Congress. One option is that it only precludes the other branches 
from negating a determination’s legal consequences. Here, a statute 
might impinge on Article II by purporting, for example, to deny 
sovereign immunity to a duly recognized state or granting immuni-
ty to one that the President refuses to recognize. Yet the Admin-
istration probably loses under such an analysis—§ 214(d) would 
pass muster because, as suggested above, it does not superimpose 
any of the traditional legal consequence of recognition onto an ex-
ecutive policy of neutrality. 
A second option would give Article II a broader sweep by hold-
ing that the recognition power precludes the other branches from 
engaging in any activity that foreign governments might reasonably 
interpret as inconsistent with the President’s determination. This 
appears to be the Administration’s view,23 and it would likely ren-
der § 214(d) invalid insofar as the statute sows confusion among 
foreign governments. But this approach has several weaknesses. 
First, there does not appear to be much risk of confusion at a retail 
level. The petitioners seek to have Menachem Zivotofsky’s passport 
say “Israel,” not “Jerusalem, Israel.”24 Given that this language 
makes no explicit claim about the city’s status, it is hard to believe 
that it would give foreign customs officials any impression about 
U.S. policy, let alone a false one. 
Second, it is questionable that substantial confusion results 
from the statute even at a more wholesale level. Both houses of 
                                                            
 
 
 
23 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 20, at 53-54.  
24 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 14.  
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Congress understand § 214(d) as leaving U.S. policy undisturbed,25 
and the Administration’s focus on interference with the implemen-
tation of neutrality implicitly concedes the point.26 In other words, 
neither of the political branches views the statute as officially rec-
ognizing Jerusalem as part of Israel. To anticipate foreign confusion 
in these circumstances is to suggest that governments will read into 
the law a meaning that Congress and the President have not es-
poused. These governments, if they exist, are a very particular 
breed—sufficiently informed to know about § 214(d), but sufficient-
ly uninformed to think it means something other than what the U.S. 
Government says it means. I am skeptical that this is a valid source 
of constitutional concern; any government that pays attention must 
know that the United States retains an official policy of neutrality. 
Finally, even if the statute or individual passports generate con-
fusion, holding § 214(d) unconstitutional will not create clarity. The 
federal judiciary—including the D.C. Circuit—has referred to Jeru-
salem as part of Israel in dozens of published decisions over the 
years.27 And as one amicus brief points out, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and Interior De-
partment’s Board of Geographic Names routinely refer to Jerusalem 
as part of Israel in public documents.28 Even though this usage is 
                                                            
 
 
 
25 See Brief for Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 20, at 22.; Brief for the United States Senate 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 20, at 20-21.  
26 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 25, 35.  
27 See, e.g., United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 722 F.3d 677, 681 
(5th Cir. 2013); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 917 (6th Cir. 2010); Wexler v. Westfield Bd. of Ed., 
784 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1986); Ilan-Gat Eng’rs, Ltd. v. Antigua Int’l Bank, 659 F.2d 
234, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F. Supp. 2d 292, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 348 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (D. 
Del. 2004); Menechem v. Frydman-Menachem, 240 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439 (D. Md. 
2003); Weinstein v. Friedman, 859 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Kahane v. Sec’y 
of State, 700 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (D.D.C. 1988).  
28 Brief of the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law and Profes-
sors of Foreign Relations and Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, supra note 20, at 26-28.  
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diametrically at odds with a national policy of strict neutrality, the 
President apparently tolerates it, and it will presumably continue 
after Zivotofsky. True, the State Department issues passports to facil-
itate international travel, so foreign governments will view the con-
tents of these documents even while potentially overlooking other 
publications that refer to Jerusalem in disfavored ways. In that re-
gard, § 214(d) could cause greater disruption to foreign relations. 
But in an era when even most domestic actions have an unavoida-
ble international audience, this seems like a distinction without 
practical significance. Moreover, passport details are even further 
removed from recognition than other official usage insofar as they 
reflect the personal identification preferences of private citizens.  
  
III.  The Statute Compels Diplomacy 
 
Whatever one thinks about the recognition question, § 214(d) 
might suffer from a separation of powers problem that the parties 
and lower courts have not directly addressed. The issue is that 
while the President has extensive power over whether and how to 
engage the United States in official diplomatic communications 
with foreign sovereigns,29 § 214(d) constitutes a legislative attempt 
to dictate the content of some of those communications through the 
medium of the passport. In other words, the statute does not in-
trude upon Article II as an act that changes or interferes with U.S. 
recognition policy, but it might intrude as an attempt to compel of-
ficial diplomacy.  
The foundation for this idea is that the United States has long 
treated the passport as a diplomatic document with a communica-
tive function. As the Supreme Court explained in 1835, this is 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
29 See Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. REV. 331, 332 (2013) 
(describing the traditional view about the president’s control over diplomatic com-
munications).  
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a document which, from its nature and object, is addressed 
to [a] foreign power; purporting only to be a request, that 
the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and is to be con-
sidered rather in the character of a political document, by 
which the bearer is recognized, in foreign countries, as an 
American citizen; and which, by usage and the law of na-
tions, is received as evidence of the fact.30 
 
Passports thus constitute a formal U.S. request for safe passage 
and a representation about the identity of the bearer. While the 
document has since acquired the additional function of controlling 
departure from U.S. territory, it retains its diplomatic character in 
modern practice.31 The result is that a statute dictating the content 
of a passport is in effect an order for the President to engage in a 
specified form of diplomacy. In the case of an individual who exer-
cises her right under § 214(d), that diplomacy must entail an official 
representation that the bearer has chosen to identify herself as a 
person born in Israel.  
It is not clear that this practice is compatible with the separation 
of powers. On one hand, the President has not consistently objected 
to legislative interventions in diplomatic affairs. Over the last sever-
al decades Congress passed a variety of statutes that aim to dictate 
executive communications to foreign governments. For instance, the 
Metric Conversion Act of 1975 required the U.S. Metric Board to 
consult with foreign officials to develop international support for 
metric standards proposed by the United States.32 The Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984 mandated that the U.S. Trade Representative 
“seek to obtain the reduction or elimination of . . . export perfor-
                                                            
 
 
 
30 Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. 692, 699 (1835) (quoted in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116, 120 (1958)); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“A passport is, in a 
sense, a letter of introduction in which the issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer 
and requests other sovereigns to aid the bearer.”).  
31 Haig, 453 U.S. at 293. 
32 Pub. L. No. 94-168, § 2, 89 Stat. 1007 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 205e(6)). 
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10 
mance requirements through consultations and negotiations” with 
foreign governments whose requirements adversely affect U.S. eco-
nomic interests.33 Dodd-Frank obliges the Treasury Department to 
consult with foreign regulatory authorities in investigating and ad-
dressing economic risks posed by overseas financial companies.34 
And the list goes on.35 As far as I can tell, only twice has the Presi-
dent objected that any of these mandates conflict with the separa-
tion of powers.36  
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons to think that 
congressional attempts to compel diplomacy violate Article II. First, 
other than perhaps the Declare War Clause, which expressly grants 
Congress control over a discrete category of international commu-
nication,37 the Constitution assigns exclusively to the President all 
power to interface with foreign nations on behalf of the United 
States.38 Article I supports this position by generally omitting sover-
                                                            
 
 
 
33 Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 307(1), 98 Stat. 3012 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2114d(1)). 
34 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 112(d)(3)(C), 
113(f)(3), 113(i) & 175(c), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5322(d)(3)(C) (2012), 5323(f)(3) (2012), 5323(i) & 
5373(c) (2012).  
35 See, e.g., Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 403(b) 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6443(b) (2012); Deepwater Port Act Amendments of 1984 § 5(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 
1518(a)(3) (2012); Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act § 118(f), 30 U.S.C. § 
1428(f) (2012); Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 § 204(b)(9), 16 
U.S.C. § 1824(b)(9) (2012); )); Fisherman’s Protective Act of 1967 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 1975(a)(1)). 
36 See William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Religious Free-
dom Act of 1998, 34 WKLY COMPILATION PRES. DOCS. 2149, 2149 (1998); Gerald R. 
Ford, Statement on Signing the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 
(Apr. 13, 1976), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5841. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Even here, Congress’s power is limited; it is one 
thing to say that Congress has power to declare war, but another to say that Con-
gress has power to transmit that declaration to a foreign recipient. 
38 See, e.g., In re Metzger, 46 U.S. 176, 181 (1847) (“Under our institutions there ex-
ists but one legitimate channel of communication between this and any foreign na-
tion; that organ is the executive.”). 
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eign diplomacy from the enumerated powers of Congress,39 and 
Article II provides further support by establishing executive powers 
that logically require diplomacy for their exercise.40 Use of the pow-
er to make treaties or receive ambassadors, for example, necessarily 
entails communication with a foreign sovereign.41   
Second, there is precedent for treating the conferral of a power 
in Article II as prohibiting Congress not only from exercising that 
power, but also from imposing restraints on the manner in which 
the President exercises it. For instance, it is accepted that Congress 
cannot restrict the President’s use of the pardon power42 or removal 
of cabinet officers under the Vesting Clause,43 and influential com-
mentators have argued that the President has a preclusive power to 
superintend the military under the Commander in Chief Clause.44 If 
the basis for these conclusions is simply that the relevant power is 
located in Article II and not expressly subject to congressional limi-
tation, then the President’s power to communicate with foreign 
                                                            
 
 
 
39 With the possible exception of the Declare War Clause, Article I, Section 8 does 
not include any powers whose exercise necessarily entails communication with for-
eign governments. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
40 See Scoville, supra note 29, at 358-63 (identifying a textual bases for executive 
control over diplomatic communications made on behalf of the United States).  
41 See Scoville, supra note 29, at 358-63. 
42 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (“The power thus conferred is unlim-
ited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and 
may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are 
taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the 
President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of 
his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.”). 
43 Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (holding that congressionally 
imposed restrictions on the removal of executive officers is unconstitutional if the 
restrictions are “of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform 
his constitutional duty” to take care that the laws are faithfully executed).  
44 See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at 
the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 689 (2008). 
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12 
governments is similarly preclusive, particularly if its source is the 
expansive Vesting Clause.45  
To the extent that it matters, evidence of original meaning offers 
insight into why the Framers might have favored such a position. 
The Congress of the Confederation had an unimpressive track rec-
ord on diplomatic affairs. It was slow in corresponding with foreign 
states46 and had a hard time maintaining secrecy.47 In addition, key 
participants in the ratification debates believed that the legislative 
branch is ill-equipped for diplomacy due to a perceived tendency 
for legislators to lack adequate knowledge of world affairs, act on 
the mercurial pressures of short-term electoral politics, and focus on 
the parochial interests of constituents rather than the nation as a 
whole.48 These perceptions appear to have fueled a belief in superi-
or executive competency.49  
Finally, there is nothing new to the idea that congressional ef-
forts to compel diplomacy might be problematic. Modern presi-
dents have on several occasions claimed an indefeasible power to 
choose the particular form and manner in which to conduct sover-
eign diplomatic communications. For example, different admin-
istrations have declined to honor statutes that purport to restrict the 
President’s ability to choose the individuals comprising U.S. delega-
tions to international conferences50 and the fora in which diplomatic 
                                                            
 
 
 
45 Cf. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 317-24 (2001) (arguing that the Vesting Clause is a key 
source of the president’s power to engage in diplomacy with foreign governments). 
46 Scoville, supra note 29, at 366-67. 
47 Scoville, supra note 29, at 366-67. 
48 Scoville, supra note 29, at 367-70. 
49 Scoville, supra note 29, at 367-70. 
50 See Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 37-
39, 42 (1990) (concluding that a statute interfered with executive diplomacy powers 
by conditioning the president’s ability to obligate appropriated funds for U.S. dele-
gations to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on his inclusion of 
certain individuals in the delegation).  
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contacts will occur.51 One particularly relevant precedent comes 
from the first Bush Administration, which saw Congress enact a law 
prohibiting the Secretary of State from issuing more than one dip-
lomatic passport to any U.S. official traveling in the Middle East.52 
The Administration declined to follow Congress’s injunction be-
cause the “attempt to dictate to the President the scope of permissi-
ble communications with foreign governments by means of pass-
ports” interfered with the President’s diplomacy power.53  
In short, it is plausible that § 214(d) infringes on Article II even 
if the statute does not change or interfere with U.S. recognition poli-
cy. Justice Kagan seems to have suggested as much at oral argu-
ment.54 One wonders whether the other Justices agree. 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
51 See Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropria-
tions Act 4, 7-8 & n.9 (Op. O.L.C. June 1, 2009) (concluding that an act of Congress 
unconstitutionally interfered with the president’s diplomacy powers by prohibiting 
the State Department from using appropriated funds to pay for a U.S. delegation to 
any UN agency, commission, or body that is chaired by a terrorist-list state). 
52 See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic 
Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18 (1992). 
53 Id. at 25. 
54 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 20-21.  
